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The “Make or Take” Decision in an Electronic Market: 





This paper uses experimental asset markets to investigate the evolution of liquidity in an 
electronic limit order market.  Our market setting includes salient features of electronic markets, 
as well as informed traders and liquidity traders.  We focus on the strategies of the traders, and 
how these are affected by trader type, characteristics of the market, and characteristics of the 
asset.  We find that informed traders use more limit orders than do liquidity traders.  We also 
find that liquidity provision shifts over time, with informed traders increasingly providing 
liquidity in markets.  This evolution is consistent with the risk advantage informed traders have 




The “Make or Take” Decision in an Electronic Market: 
Evidence on the Evolution of Liquidity 
 
 
 Electronic markets have emerged as popular venues for the trading of a wide variety of 
financial assets. Stock exchanges in many countries including Canada, Germany, Israel, and the 
United Kingdom have adopted electronic structures to trade equities, as has Euronext, the new 
market combining eight former European stock exchanges. In the United States, Electronic 
Communications Networks (ECNs) such as Island, Instinet, and Archipelago use an electronic 
order book structure to trade as much as 45% of the volume on Nasdaq. There are now several 
electronic systems trading corporate bonds (e.g., eSpeed) and government bonds (Govpix), 
while, in foreign exchange, electronic systems such as EBS and Reuters dominate the trading of 
currencies. Eurex, the electronic Swiss-German exchange, is now the world’s largest futures 
market, and with the opening of the new International Securities Exchange, even options now 
trade in electronic markets. 
 Many such electronic markets are organized as electronic limit order books. In this 
structure, there is no designated liquidity provider such as a specialist or a dealer; instead, 
liquidity arises endogenously from the submitted orders of traders. Traders who submit orders to 
buy or sell the asset at a particular price are said to “make” liquidity, while traders who choose to 
hit existing orders are said to “take” liquidity. The spread and price behavior in such markets 
thus reflect the willingness of traders to supply and demand liquidity. 
 In this paper, we use an experimental market setting to investigate the evolution of 
liquidity in an electronic limit order market.   Our market setting possesses the salient features of 
electronic markets: continuous trading, a visible “book” of orders, price-time order priority rules, 
instantaneous trade reporting rules, order cancellation capabilities, and both limit order and 
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market order functionality. While many experiments have used continuous double-auction 
market similar to the electronic markets we investigate (see the review by Sunder [1995]), our 
experiment is the first to focus primarily on the provision and use of liquidity in such markets.  
Our experimental market contains informed traders who have superior information and liquidity 
traders who face both large and small liquidity needs.  We manipulate both the prior distribution 
and the realizations of security values.  These manipulations allow us to analyze market behavior 
in ways unavailable in actual markets. In particular, we can analyze explicitly the strategies of 
informed and liquidity traders, and we can determine the factors that influence traders’ make or 
take decisions. 
 Our particular focus in this paper is on three questions. First, how do informed and 
liquidity traders differ in their provision and use of market liquidity?  Second, how do 
characteristics of the market, such as depth in the book or time left to trade, affect these 
strategies? And, third, how do characteristics of the underlying asset such as asset value volatility 
affect the provision of market liquidity? Addressing these questions allows us to provide insights 
not only into the functioning of electronic markets, but into the emergence of market liquidity as 
well. 
 Numerous authors in finance have examined aspects of these questions both theoretically 
and empirically, and there has also been related work in the experimental literature. Theoretical 
analyses of limit orders include Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb [1981]; Rock [1990]; 
Angel [1994]; Glosten [1994]; Kumar and Seppi [1994]; Chakravarty and Holden [1995]; 
Parlour [1998]; Harris [1998]; Foucault [1999]; Parlour and Seppi [2001]; and Foucault, Kadan, 
and Kandel [2001].  Empirical studies of specific limit order markets include Biais, Hillion, and 
Spatt [1995]; Hollifield, Miller, and Sandas [1999]; Ahn, Bae and Chan [2001]; and Hasbrouck 
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and Saar [2001].  In general, these analyses have provided useful characterizations of limit order 
behavior, but the complexity of traders’ decision problems has required selectivity in what 
aspects of trader or market behavior can be considered. 
 Our analysis provides a number of important new results. Of special significance, we find 
that informed traders actively submit limit orders.  Indeed, both trader types use limit orders and 
market orders, but informed traders tend to use more limit orders than do liquidity traders. This 
behavior contrasts with the common assumption in the theoretical literature that informed traders 
only take liquidity, and do not provide it.  One consequence of this behavior is that the book of 
orders has information content. 
What we find particularly intriguing is that liquidity provision changes dramatically over 
time, and the key to this evolution is the behavior of the informed traders. When trading begins, 
informed traders are much more likely to take liquidity, hitting existing orders so as to profit 
from their private information. As prices move toward true values, the informed traders shift to 
submitting limit orders. This shift is so pronounced that towards the end of the trading period 
informed traders on average trade more often with limit orders than do liquidity traders. This has 
the intriguing implication that informed traders provide liquidity in various market conditions 
even as they speculate on their information. Liquidity traders who need to buy or sell a large 
number of shares, on the other hand, tend to use more limit orders early on, but as the end of the 
trading period approaches switch to market orders in order to meet their targets. 
The informed traders also seem to change their strategies depending on the value of their 
information. When that value is high, informed traders tend to use more market orders in order to 
realize trading profit before prices adjust. When the value of their information is low, they move 
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very quickly to assume the role of dealers and trade predominantly by supplying limit orders to 
the market.  
This dual role for the informed, acting as both traders and dealers, highlights the 
important ways that information influences markets. While it is the trading of the informed that 
ultimately moves prices to efficient levels, the superior information of the informed also makes 
these traders better able to provide liquidity to other traders in the market. Thus, unlike in 
theoretical models where the informed stop trading once their information is incorporated into 
prices, we find that the informed now profit further by taking on the role of liquidity providers 
and essentially earning the spread. In a symmetric information world, Stoll [1978] argued that 
the market maker would be a trader who was better diversified than the others and thus better 
able to bear risk. We show that in an asymmetric information setting, it is the informed traders 
who ultimately have the risk advantage because they know more about where the price should 
be. Thus, a market-making role arises endogenously in our electronic markets, adopted by traders 
for whom the risk of entering a limit order is lower than it is for other traders.  
Our analysis may suggest why it is that electronic markets have been so successful in 
competing with more traditional market structures. Even in the presence of information 
asymmetry, the traders themselves will provide liquidity, eschewing the need for a formal, and 
typically more expensive, liquidity provider. While it is possible that such endogenous liquidity 
will dissipate in more uncertain market conditions, those same conditions make it difficult for 
designated liquidity providers to do much either.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the economic theory 
regarding limit order markets, with a particular focus on the factors affecting traders’ order 
decisions. This section also sets out the questions we will address, and it provides a rationale for 
 7
why we use an experimental methodology in this research. Section 3 then describes our 
experimental markets and manipulations. Section 4 then presents our results. The paper’s final 
section is a conclusion. 
 
2. The Nature of Limit Order Markets 
In an electronic market, traders face a number of choices in formulating their trading 
strategy. Certainly, a basic choice is whether to make or take an order. A trader makes an order 
by placing a limit order to buy or sell the asset at a specific price; a trader takes an order by 
agreeing to trade as the counter-party to an existing limit order. This latter trading strategy 
essentially corresponds to trading via a market order. While this decision can be thought of as 
“how” to trade, traders also must decide “when” to trade. A trader wishing to transact multiple 
shares can do so quickly, or she can spread her orders out. The trader can opt to trade early in the 
day, at the last minute, or at any point in between. Of course, in an electronic market deciding 
when to trade is also affected by the presence or absence of counter-parties wishing to trade. 
Finally, the trader faces the related decision of “what” to trade. Is she a buyer, a seller, or 
sometimes both? In an electronic market, each of these decisions affects not only the trader’s 
individual profit and loss, but the behavior of the market as well. This latter linkage arises 
because liquidity is endogenous in an electronic market, arising solely from the trading strategies 
and collective behavior of the traders in the market. 
While there is a large literature in market microstructure analyzing the trading process, 
the specific literature looking at trader strategies in electronic limit order markets is still fairly 
small. This paucity reflects the difficulty of characterizing how, when, and what to trade when 
the market outcome attaching to individual strategies depends upon the collective strategies of all 
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other market participants as well. This trading problem is further complicated if some traders are 
better informed about the security’s true value than others. The complexity of the trading 
environment, combined with the inter-dependence of traders’ decisions, makes characterizing a 
trader’s optimal order strategy quite difficult; adding in asymmetric information makes the 
problem generally intractable.    
Most theoretical studies make their analyses tractable by imposing highly restrictive 
assumptions.  These assumptions raise concerns about the robustness of their conclusions.  We 
use experimental markets to test the robustness of predictions derived from restricted models, 
and to shed light on behavior in less restrictive settings.  We impose rigorous experimental 
controls that allow us to attribute our experimental results unambiguously to variables that are 
important in theoretical work.  For example, to investigate the effects of asset-value volatility on 
the submissions strategies of traders, we compare trading of high-volatility assets with trading of 
low-volatility assets.  Because all other aspects of the markets are the same, comparing outcomes 
between the two markets characterizes the specific effects of volatility on market behavior. An 
obvious advantage of this approach is that traders are allowed to pursue whatever equilibrium 
strategies they prefer; what matters is simply how these strategies differ with the treatment 
variable. Perhaps equally important, experimental markets provide for multiple replications, 
allowing us to focus on the typical equilibrium outcome, and not merely on an outcome that is 
theoretically possible albeit highly unlikely.  
The first stream of literature motivating our experiment achieves tractability by making 
restrictive assumptions about the behavior of informed traders, or by ignoring such traders 
completely.  For example, the early literature looking at limit order markets focused on the trade-
off between the immediate execution of taking the limit order versus the better price, and 
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uncertain execution, of making a limit order. Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb [1981] 
developed a “gravitational pull” model of limit orders to explain when a trader would submit a 
limit order as opposed to a market order (the functional equivalent of taking a limit order). These 
authors showed that as spreads narrow, the benefits of the better price available to limit order 
traders decreases, causing more traders to prefer the certain execution of the market order. As 
traders shift from limit orders to market orders, however, the spread widens, thereby increasing 
the attractiveness of the limit order price improvement potential. Thus, a trader’s decision 
regarding how to trade involves a dynamic balancing of the relative costs of price improvement 
and execution risk.  However, Cohen, et al. ignore the role of informed traders in their market.   
Rock [1990], Glosten [1994], and Seppi [1997] explicitly incorporate informed traders 
into their models, but assume that they always enter market orders instead of limit orders.  This 
research allows a number of insights into the role of the “winner's curse” problem of limit order 
execution.  If there is asymmetric information between traders, then limit order submitters may 
face an adverse execution risk:  limit orders will more likely execute when they generate a loss to 
the limit order submitter.   
Because the results and tractability of these models depend critically on the assumptions 
about informed traders, the first goal of our experiment is to examine behavior when these 
assumptions are relaxed. We therefore create a setting in which both liquidity and informed 
traders can choose between limit and market orders.   
Another stream of literature examines how both liquidity and informed traders choose 
between limit and market orders, and makes the settings more tractable by exogenously imposing 
market characteristics (such as the state of the limit order book) affecting those decisions.  The 
decisions are still quite complex.  Consider, for example, the problem facing an informed trader. 
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The informed trader would like to profit from his information, and this suggests trading as 
frequently as possible. But rapidly taking limit orders will lead prices to quickly converge to full 
information levels. Alternatively, submitting a limit order or a series of limit orders might allow 
the trader to better hide his information, and to trade at better prices. But it does so by delaying 
trading, and exposes the trader to execution risk. If there are other informed traders, then this 
strategy may prove sub-optimal, in part because the clustering of orders on the book may signal 
the presence, and value, of new information. And if liquidity traders act strategically, they may 
delay trading to allow the competition of the informed to reveal these new prices.  
Angel [1994] and Harris [1998] provide some predictions on how informed traders will 
behave.  They argue that informed traders are less likely to use limit orders than are liquidity 
traders.  Furthermore, informed traders are more likely to use market orders if the realized asset 
value is farther away from its expected value. This preference reflects the desire of informed 
traders to capitalize on their private information. 
Harris [1998] also predicts that liquidity traders needing to meet a target will start by 
using limit orders, and then switch to market orders as the end of trading (their "deadline") 
approaches. A similar prediction applies to the informed traders: the likelihood of submitting a 
limit order decreases with time until the end of trading (when their information is revealed). In 
both cases, more time provides traders with flexibility to design a limit order strategy that avoids 
paying the spread.  
To test these predictions, our experiment includes liquidity traders who are forced to buy 
or sell some number of shares before the market closes.  We manipulate the extremity of realized 
security values relative to the prior expected value, as a way of manipulating the value of the 
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informed traders’ information. We also examine trader behavior separately at different points 
during the trading period to test the predictions with respect to time.  
A third stream of literature constructs more complete equilibria in which key market 
attributes (such as bid-ask spreads and book depth) arise endogenously.  These dynamic 
equilibrium models allow traders' optimal strategies to depend on conjectures of other traders’ 
strategies. To simplify the analysis, however, traders solve static problems in which they are 
allowed to take only one action (i.e., submitting a market or a limit order without the ability to 
return to the market and update their strategies).  
Foucault [1999] uses such a model to predict a higher submission rate of limit orders by 
traders when true value volatility is greater. Since traders are unable to cancel their limit orders, 
higher volatility increases the likelihood that their limit orders will become mispriced. The 
greater risk of being picked off leads traders to price the limit orders less aggressively. This 
increases the spread in the market, which makes market orders more expensive and decreases 
their proportion in the order flow.   
Parlour [1998] shows how traders’ decisions are influenced by the (endogenously-
determined) state of the limit order book.  Her analysis focuses on “crowding out” that arises due 
to the time priority of orders already in the book.  Thus, Parlour’s model predicts that depth at 
the best price on the same side of the book decreases the likelihood of submitting a limit order, 
while depth at the best price on the opposite side of the book increases this probability.  
However, neither Foucault nor Parlour incorporate in their models traders with private 
information about the security. We test the implications of these two studies by manipulating the 
volatility of security value, and also by measuring the depth at the best prices in the limit order 
book.   
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3. Experimental Design 
 We now describe the nature of our experiment and the specific features of our markets. 
As a useful preliminary, we note the following definitions. A cohort is a group of six traders who 
always trade together. A security is a claim on a terminal dividend, and is identified by the value 
of the security and the traders' liquidity needs (described below). A trading period is a time 
interval during which traders can take trading actions. A session is a 75-minute period during 
which traders participate in a series of markets. Unless otherwise indicated, all prices, values and 
winnings are denominated in laboratory dollars ($), an artificial currency that is converted into 
US currency at the end of the experiment. 
 
3.1. Experimental Design 
 Basic Design. We seek to examine how the trading behavior of informed and uninformed 
traders differs with the volatility of security value, the extremity of realized value from the prior 
expected value, with elapsed time, and with the depth of the book. Our experiment includes eight 
cohorts of 6 traders, for a total of 48 participants. 
To manipulate information, two informed traders were told the true security value before 
trading in the security began. Four liquidity traders were not told the security value until trading 
in the security has ended.  
To manipulate volatility, we altered the distribution of security values. In a high-volatility 
setting, traders are told that values are distributed approximately uniformly over the interval from 
0 to 50 laboratory dollars. In a low-volatility setting, traders are told that values are distributed 
according to a truncated bell-shaped distribution (over the interval 0 to 50) with a mean of 25 
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laboratory dollars and a standard deviation of 5. In both cases, the expected value is the same; 
only the variance about that expectation is different. Each cohort trades 10 securities in the high-
volatility setting and 10 securities in the low-volatility setting. 
To manipulate extremity, we presented traders with high-extremity realizations that were 
at least $15 from expected value, and low-extremity realizations that were no more than $7 from 
expected value. 
To manipulate elapsed time during trading for a security, we distinguished between 
decisions made at eight fifteen-second intervals during the 120 seconds of trading in each 
security. 
 Taken as a whole, our experiment uses a fully factorial repeated-measures design, with 
the following factors: trader type (informed, large liquidity trader, small liquidity trader), 
volatility (high, low) extremity (high, low), replication (there are three securities in each 
volatility x extremity combination), time (arbitrarily broken into eight 15-second periods), and 
cohort (eight cohorts of six traders each). Trader type and cohort membership are manipulated 
across traders, and all other factors are manipulated within traders.  
 
Controls. The experiment also includes controls to ensure the treatment effects are not 
driven by differences that are not the focus of our study.  To eliminate possible effects of minor 
differences in security, each cohort traded 12 securities that have identical deviations from the 
prior expected value of $25 (see Table 1). Thus, tests of extremity and volatility allow us to 
compare outcomes across cohorts for securities that are identical in all key respects. To ensure 
that the total distribution of security values in each setting was distributed as indicated to traders, 
we also included eight additional securities with relatively extreme values (for the high-volatility 
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setting) or relatively central values (for the low-volatility setting). However, we did not include 
these securities in our analyses. 
The experiment also controls the order of securities and treatments. Four of the cohorts 
traded first in the high-volatility setting and then in the low-volatility setting, while the other four 
traded in the opposite order. All cohorts traded the securities in exactly the same order. We also 
altered the sign of deviations from the prior expected value of $25 across securities and across 
cohorts.  
We count on the random assignment of participants to trader types to minimize the 
possibility that differences across trader types are driven by individual differences.  
 
3.2 Trading 
Market activity in each security takes place during two periods. During a “pretrading” 
period, traders have the opportunity to enter orders, but no trades are executed. During a main 
trading period, traders can continue to enter orders, and can also take other traders’ orders. We 
included the pretrading period to allow the order book to be full at the beginning of the main 
trading period. 
Pretrading. Pretrading lasts 30 seconds, during which traders can enter bids (orders to buy 
one share at a chosen price) and asks (orders to sell one share at a chosen price). Traders can 
delete their orders at any time during the period. Traders can enter as many bids and asks as they 
wish, but cannot enter bids or asks that would result in one of their own outstanding bids having 
a price equal to or greater than the price of one of their own outstanding asks. All bids and asks 
must have integer prices between 0 and 50, inclusive. Traders are allowed to enter bids at prices 
above the lowest outstanding ask, and can enter asks at prices less than the highest bid. These 
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“crossing” orders are dealt with as discussed below. No trade takes place during the pre-trading 
period.  
At the end of the pretrading period, the order book is purged of crossing orders in the 
following way. If the highest bid crosses with the lowest ask, the more recent of the two orders is 
deleted from the book. This process is repeated until the high bid is less than the low ask. 
Main Trading. Main trading, which lasts 120 seconds, is exactly like pretrading, with two 
exceptions. First, traders are allowed to take other traders’ bids and asks. Traders take an ask by 
clicking a “buy 1” button, which allows them to buy one share at the lowest current asking price. 
Traders take a bid by clicking a “sell 1” button, which allows them to sell one share at the 
highest current bid price. Taking an ask is equivalent to entering a market buy order, while 
taking a bid is equivalent to entering a market sell order. Older limit orders are executed first. 
Second, traders are not allowed to enter limit orders that cross with existing limit orders from 
other traders. In other words, there are no "marketable limit orders," and immediate execution is 
achieved by submitting market orders (i.e., taking existing limit orders in the book).1 
Market Transparency. As soon as a trader enters an order, the order is shown on every 
trader’s computer screen, indicating that an unidentified trader is willing to buy or sell one more 
share at the posted price. As shown in Figure 1, the screen includes two graphs showing market 
activity. The left side of each graph shows every price at which an order has been posted (shown 
in green for the highest bid and lowest ask price, and yellow for other prices), and the number of 
shares posted at that price (shown by the number to the left of the graph). The right side of each 
graph shows every price at which the trader has personally posted an order, and the number of 
                                                 
1
 More specifically, a limit buy order can only be submitted at prices below the best ask price in the book, and a 
limit sell order can be submitted at prices above the best bid price in the book (so that the market cannot be 
"crossed" or "locked"). 
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shares that the trader has posted at that price.2 The center of each graph also includes a solid red 
line indicating the highest bid or lowest ask entered by any trader, and a solid green line 
indicating the highest bid or lowest ask entered by that particular trader. 
Reporting of orders during trading is similar to reporting during pretrading. All trades are 
reported immediately to all traders, indicating the price and the trade direction (whether the trade 
involved a market buy and an ask or a market sell and a bid). 
 
3.3 Trader Types 
The market includes three types of traders. Two informed traders know the true value of 
the security, which they learn before trading begins. The remaining four traders have a trading 
“target” to meet before trading is complete. One trader’s target is to sell 20 shares; another’s is to 
buy 20 shares; another’s is to sell five shares, and another’s is to buy five shares. We refer to the 
first two as large liquidity traders and the last two as small liquidity traders. At the end of 
trading, liquidity traders are assessed a penalty equal to $50 for each unfulfilled share. This 
penalty is large enough that it is worth trading at any price, no matter how unfavorable, to hit 
their target. The goal of a liquidity trader is to meet his or her target at the most favorable prices 
possible. Once they hit their targets, liquidity traders can buy or sell as many shares as they 
please without penalty. 
  
3.4 Subjects, Instructions and Incentives 
 The experiments were conducted in the Business Simulation Laboratory (BSL) at the 
Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University. The participants in the 
                                                 
2
 The screen does not provide traders with information about their time priority at a particular price. As is generally 
true in markets organized as electronic limit order books, traders infer their place in the queue from the number of 
shares in the book at a certain price when they submit an order.  
 17
experiments were Johnson MBA students. Each session involved twelve participants who were 
split randomly into two cohorts of six participants each. Upon arriving at the BSL, each subject 
received detailed written instructions, a copy of which is given in Appendix A. The instructions 
were reviewed in detail by the experiment administrator, who also answered any questions. The 
administrator then guided participants through the use and interpretation of the computer 
interface by trading two practice securities, which were exactly like the securities to be traded 
during the experiment, except that trading outcomes did not affect participants’ cash winnings. 
Traders started trading in each security with an endowment of $0 in cash and zero shares. 
However, unlimited negative cash and share balances were permitted. Thus, traders could hold 
any inventory of shares they desired, including large short positions. Traders were told that at the 
end of trading, shares paid a liquidating dividend equal to their true value, so that their net 
trading gain or loss for a security would simply be equal to their ending share balance times the 
value of each share, plus their ending cash balance. Any penalties assessed to a liquidity trader 
for failing to hit a target are deducted from this trading gain or added to her trading loss. 
 Cash winnings for each session were determined by subtracting a “floor” from each 
trader’s winnings in laboratory dollars, and then multiplying by an exchange rate that converts 
laboratory dollars into US dollars. The floor and exchange rate were derived from pilot 
experiments separately for each type of trader, and were designed so that each type would 
receive average winnings of approximately $20/session. Traders were not told the floor or 
exchange rate, however, to minimize gaming behavior that might arise if traders knew they were 








The focus of our analysis is on the order strategies of traders: the choice between taking 
and making liquidity in a limit order market.  We begin with market-wide summary statistics to 
provide a sense of how typical is the aggregate behavior that results from these experiments. We 
then examine differences in the use of market and limit orders by informed traders and liquidity 
traders, and we further investigate the differences between small and large liquidity traders. We 
next present results on how the submission rates of limit orders (relative to market orders) evolve 
through time, and on how the volatility of a security or the value of information held by informed 
traders affect trader strategies. Lastly, we examine how depth in the limit order book affects the 
traders' "Make or Take" decision. 
The statistical tests in this section use a repeated-measures ANOVA. To judge statistical 
significance, we compute the average of the dependent variable within each cell (defined by the 
appropriate factors) for each of the eight cohorts. A repeated-measures analysis effectively treats 
each cohort as providing a single independent observation of the dependent variable.  This 
design therefore reduces the problem, common in experimental economics, of overstating 
statistical significance by assuming that repetitions of the same actions by the same subject or 
group of subjects are independent events. When appropriate, we will use the ANOVA 
terminology of "main effect," "interaction," and "simple effect" to describe the statistical tests. A 
main effect examines the influence of one factor averaging over all the levels of the other factors. 
An interaction is when the effect of one factor is different at different levels of the other factors. 
A simple effect looks at the influence of one factor holding another factor at a specific level.3 
                                                 
3
 For example, a significant Time main effect without a significant Type*Time interaction means that time exerts a 
similar influence on the behavior of all trader types. A significant Type*Time interaction implies that the different 
types of traders behave differently over time with respect to the dependent variable under investigation. In such a 
case, we would also examine the significance of simple effects that look at the influence of one factor holding 
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4.1. Summary Statistics of Market-Wide Measures 
Figure 2 presents the evolution over time of three market-wide variables: volume, bid-ask 
spread, and absolute errors in trade price. Each Panel divides trading into eight 15-second 
intervals. While about 55 shares changed hands in a typical market, Panel A shows that volume 
exhibits the usual "U" shape observed in equity markets, with high volume at the open and the 
close of trading. Panel B shows that time-weighted spreads decline over time, and Panel C shows 
that price errors decline over time.4  These patterns suggest that markets behave reasonably well, 
in light of theoretical, archival, and experimental studies.  Of particular importance is that our 
experimental markets appear to gradually incorporate information, a feature consistent with 
market efficiency.  
 
4.2. Summary Statistics of Traders' Strategies 
Panel A of Figure 3 presents summary statistics on the use of limit and market orders by 
informed traders, large liquidity traders, and small liquidity traders.  The figure shows that 
informed traders submit more limit orders than liquidity traders do (p = 0.0289).  That informed 
traders submit more limit orders stands in contrast to the prevailing wisdom in the theoretical 
literature. As Section 2 stresses, most theoretical models of limit order book markets assume that 
traders who provide liquidity through limit orders are uninformed about the true value of the 
security. Even the partial equilibrium models of Angel [1994] and Harris [1998], where informed 
                                                                                                                                                             
another factor at a specific level. So, we would look separately at the three types of traders to see whether time 
exerts significant influence on the behavior of each type.  
4
 The decline in the spread continues until the last interval, where it increases slightly. This is consistent with 
observed behavior in equity markets and can be explained by the desire of large liquidity traders to meet their 
trading targets and hence their use of more market orders than limit orders. The inelastic demand of the large 
liquidity traders creates profit opportunities for the other traders in the market who submit limit orders that are less 
aggressive, causing the spread to widen. This widening of the spread would also contribute to the small rise in 
ending price errors.  Such behavior is consistent with the theoretical model of Brock and Kleidon [1992]. 
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traders use limit orders under some circumstances, predict that informed traders would be less 
likely to submit limit orders than liquidity traders.5  We find this is not the case, revealing a 
complexity to informed behavior not captured by standard models.   
The panel also provides information on what happens to the submitted limit orders.  
Interestingly, most limit orders submitted by the informed traders are left to expire in the book. 
This may reflect attempts by informed traders to "game" other market participants by submitting 
limit orders away from the market price, thereby creating an impression that the true value is 
different than otherwise believed. However, these orders also reflect genuine trading interest, as 
almost half of the trades of an informed trader (8.7 out of 17.8) occur when a limit order 
submitted by an informed trader is executed.  Note that many more of the limit orders submitted 
by the liquidity traders are executed or cancelled, suggesting that these traders face (or fear they 
face) adverse selection.  
Panel A also provides important information concerning the behavior of liquidity traders. 
Large liquidity traders trade an average of about 23 shares, slightly above their target of 20 
shares. Small liquidity traders trade an average of about 14.4 shares, almost three times their 
target of five shares.  The difference between the target and the actual number of shares traded 
points to a fundamental dissimilarity in the behavior of these two types of liquidity traders. The 
large liquidity traders are closer to the ideal definition of liquidity traders who trade for 
exogenous reasons. The average time it takes for a large liquidity trader to meet her target is 100 
seconds, which means that she spends most of the trading period working towards completing 
this task. On the other hand, small liquidity traders meet their targets on average in 45 seconds 
(where the difference among the trader types is highly significant, p<0.0001). After they hit their 
targets, small liquidity traders start speculating in the market. Since they do not posses any 
                                                 
5
 This point is also made by Glosten [1994] for a special case of his model (see pp. 1150-1151). 
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special information about the true value of the security, their behavior is more analogous to that 
of day traders who attempt to predict short-term movements (or trends) in prices and trade to 
take advantage of them.  
Panel B of Figure 3 sheds more light on this issue by examining the pattern over time in 
the average number of shares executed by trader types. Small liquidity traders start by intensely 
trading in the first two time intervals and thereafter maintain a relatively constant level of 
trading. Since they finish their targets on average by the end of the third time interval, the rest of 
the time they speculate on trends in prices or try to make money by providing liquidity and 
earning the spread. Large liquidity traders, on the other hand, trade much of their targets in the 
second half of the trading period when prices are closer to the true value of the security. 
 
4.3 Market versus Limit Orders Over Time 
Our primary analyses examine how traders choose between making and taking liquidity 
over time.  To conduct these analyses, we define the (limit order) submission rate as the number 
of limit orders a trader submits divided by the sum of her limit and market orders.6  Figure 4 
(Panel A) plots the submission rates of the three trader types separately for the eight time 
intervals. For all trader types, the use of market orders is more likely in the first interval (i.e., the 
submission rate is lower). At the end of pre-trading period, there is a book with limit orders 
waiting to begin trading. On average, there are 64.13 shares in the book at the beginning of a 
trading period, of which 13.78 are offered at the best bid and ask prices.7 It is natural for traders 
                                                 
6
 We also replicated our analyses including only limit orders that improve, equal and come within a few ticks of the 
best existing order in the book. Our basic inferences are unchanged, so we report only the definition including all 
limit orders. 
7
 During the pretrading period, informed traders submit almost twice the number of limit orders submitted by  
liquidity traders (18.47 versus 9.33 for the small liquidity traders and 9.81 for the large liquidity traders). This 
difference is statistically significant (p=0.0011). Of the orders submitted by an informed during pretrading, 3.21 on 
average execute in the subsequent trading period, compared with 2.32 and 2.03 for the small and large liquidity 
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to start using more market orders in order to consume liquidity in the book. Informed traders 
pick-off mispriced limit orders in the book while liquidity traders use market orders to fill their 
targets. As time progresses, however, the trading strategies of the informed and the liquidity 
traders diverge. 
The behavior of the large liquidity traders conforms tightly to the prediction of Harris 
[1998]. Harris argues that traders needing to meet a target by a certain deadline would start with 
a greater propensity for using limit orders, but as time progresses would switch to using more 
market orders. This strategy attempts to avoid paying the bid-ask spread, but it does expose the 
liquidity trader to execution risk.  As the end of the trading period approaches, traders switch to 
market orders in order to meet their targets. Consistent with Harris’ prediction, the submission 
rate of the large liquidity traders falls from about 70% in the first three intervals to under 35% in 
interval 8 (this pattern is statistically significant with p<0.0001).  An analysis of trading behavior 
provides similar results.  Panel B of Figure 4 displays the “taking-rate” over time, defined as the 
percentage of trades completed using market orders (i.e., the number of market orders divided by 
the sum of market orders and executed limit orders).  The large liquidity traders trade just under 
40% of their shares by taking orders in the first interval, rising to about 65% in the final interval. 
Informed traders behave in ways very different from theoretical predictions.  Harris 
suggests that informed traders are less likely to use limit orders as time passes, but we find the 
opposite occurs. The submission rate of informed traders is just under 50% in the first interval, 
and increases to around 70% from the fourth interval on, a statistically significant change 
                                                                                                                                                             
traders, respectively. It is interesting to note that while the informed traders submit more limit orders during 
pretrading, they actively cancel fewer orders than do liquidity traders (1.20 for the informed compared with 1.24 for 
the small liquidity traders and 2.71 for the large liquidity traders). This difference is statistically significant with 
p=0.029. Most of the orders submitted by the informed traders therefore are left to expire in the book at the end of 
the trading period (or disappear when "crossed" orders are eliminated at the end of pretrading). This may reflect the 
fact that since the informed know the true value of the security, leaving stale limit orders in the book is less risky for 
them than it is for the liquidity traders. 
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(p=0.0053).  Thus, informed traders are more likely to provide liquidity as time passes.  The 
trading results are even more striking:  Panel B of Figure 4 shows that informed traders execute 
almost 60% of their trades in the first interval by taking orders, but that proportion drops to just 
over 30% in the last interval (the pattern is significant with p = 0.005).  
This apparent inconsistency with the theory can be explained by the dynamic adjustment 
of prices to private information.  Early on in trading, the security value differs from the true 
value, giving informed traders an incentive to take liquidity by trading via market orders. Over 
time, however, the security value adjusts, and at some point it is bracketed by the bid-ask spread. 
Now, market orders are unprofitable for the informed traders, but a new role for the informed 
traders emerges.  Informed traders know the exact location of the true value. They can place limit 
orders around it and supply liquidity to the market, just like dealers, making a small profit by 
means of the bid-ask spread. In fact, informed traders in principle can provide liquidity in a much 
more efficient manner than liquidity traders due to their greater knowledge of the asset value.8  
This changing role for the informed traders, from aggressive speculators to dealers, is a 
phenomenon that to a large extent was not recognized in the theoretical literature. We suspect 
this is because models must be simple enough to be solved, and the dynamic considerations that 
give rise to the change in the behavior of the informed traders were never fully modeled. It is the 
changing value of the private information due to the process of price adjustment that holds the 
key to this behavior. 
The behavior of small liquidity traders seems to be in-between the behaviors exhibited by 
the large liquidity traders and the informed traders. They start with a relatively low submission 
                                                 
8
 Since liquidity traders are faced with uncertainty over the true value, the "option value" argument implies that they 
will shade their limit order prices (i.e., make them less aggressive) to reflect that uncertainty. Since informed traders 
do not face such an uncertainty, they can price the limit orders more aggressively and be at the inside quote 
supplying liquidity to the other traders. 
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rate that increases through the third time interval (when on average they meet their targets) and 
declines steadily thereafter. Panel B of Figure 4 shows that small liquidity traders begin the 
trading period like large liquidity traders with a low taking rate (34.45%) as they attempt to use 
limit orders to save on trading costs. They do not exhibit a clear pattern, however, and end the 
trading period with approximately the same taking rate. 
  
4.4.  Volatility and Extremity 
Theoretical models suggest that informed traders would be more likely to use market 
orders when the value of their information is greater (Angel [1994], Harris [1998]). The risk of 
being picked off in Foucault [1999] implies that greater security value volatility would result in a 
higher submission rate of limit orders. We now turn to analyses that reveal the importance of 
information value by highlighting the effects of the extremity of the security realization, and also 
look at the effects of fundamental value volatility.  Table 2 presents the mean submission rates 
for each trader type, within each of the four cells created by crossing extremity of the realized 
security value (high or low) with security value volatility (high or low).  The results are 
aggregated over time intervals. 9  
The data clearly show that informed traders behave differently when the realized value of 
the security is extreme. Consistent with the predictions of Angel [1994] and Harris [1998], 
informed traders are more likely to use market orders when value extremity is high (meaning that 
their information is more valuable). The ANOVA analysis of the submission rate documents a 
                                                 
9
 Since there are no significant interactions of Time and Extremity (or Volatility), we simplify the exposition by 




significant Type*Extremity interaction (p=0.003) and a marginally significant 
Type*Extremity*Volatility interaction (p=0.0543).  
The lowest submission rate of limit orders by informed traders is in the 
VolatilityLow/ExtremityHigh cell, 61.64%. This cell can be thought of as a "surprise" cell in that 
the liquidity traders do not expect the realized value to be too far from the expected value 
because the volatility of the security is relatively low (a bell-shaped distribution). Therefore, the 
informed traders can use market orders to pick-off the liquidity traders (making a profit) for a 
longer period of time before prices adjust. When the realized value is extreme but the perceived 
volatility is higher, aggressive trading by market orders would result in greater revision in beliefs 
about the true value of the security and therefore will be less profitable. Consistent with this 
argument, the use of limit orders by informed traders in the VolatilityHigh/ExtremityHigh cell is 
higher, 67.8%. 
In the VolatilityLow/ExtremityLow cell, which we can view as a "non-surprise" cell, we 
would expect the informed traders to move very quickly to play the role of dealers. There is little 
to gain by using market orders since the realized value is close to the expected value, and so 
prices are likely to adjust very quickly. Indeed, informed traders use more limit orders in that 
cell, with a submission rate of 79.27%, to make money from the bid-ask spread. The analysis of 
simple effects confirms that the Extremity factor influences the trading strategies of informed 
traders significantly (p=0.0101), with a weaker Volatility*Extremity effect (p=0.0486).10 
We do not find support for the prediction of Foucault [1999] that higher volatility would 
result in a higher submission rate of limit orders. While the submission rate of the large liquidity 
                                                 
10
 Since liquidity traders do not know the realization of the security value, the Extremity manipulation cannot affect 
their strategies directly. In principle, differences in the strategies of the informed traders may affect market 
conditions and thus indirectly cause the liquidity traders to change their trading strategies. The simple effect tests, 
however, cannot reject that the behavior of the liquidity traders is the same across the two Extremity regimes.   
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traders, our most "typical" liquidity traders, is lower in the VolatilityLow/ExtremityLow cell, 
consistent with Foucault, the differences among the cells are not statistically significant.11  
Our results are essentially the same when we examine taking rates:  informed traders take 
much less liquidity when extremity is low than when it is high, particularly in the "surprise cell" 
where volatility is low. Extremity and volatility have no statistically significant effects on the 
taking rates of the liquidity traders. 
Theory predicts that liquidity traders should lose when trading against the informed 
traders, and this is exactly what we find. An informed trader makes on average $40.66 in trading 
profit per market, while a small (large) liquidity trader loses on average $22.89 ($17.77). The 
smaller losses of the large liquidity traders can be due to the fact that they tend to trade late in the 
trading period when prices are closer to the true value of the security.  
Panel C of Table 2 shows the trading profit and losses by volatility/extremity cells. It is 
clear that the informed (liquidity) traders make (lose) the most money in the 
VolatilityLow/ExtremityHigh "surprise" cell, where the value of information is greater and it is 
easier to pick-off the liquidity traders. In the VolatilityLow/ExtremityLow "non-surprise" cell, the 
trading profit of the informed is lowest, in line with their diminished role as speculators and the 
increase in their activity as dealers (profiting from the bid-ask spread). The ANOVA analysis of 
profit shows a significant Type*Volatility*Extremity interaction (p=0.0054).  
                                                 
11
 One advantage of conducting an experiment rather than using actual market data is our ability to separate ex-ante 
volatility, which we manipulate using the distribution of security values that is known to all traders, and ex-post 
volatility or price volatility, which is also affected by the realized value of the security. The Extremity manipulation 
affects ex-post volatility since prices move more as they adjust to information when the realized value is extreme. 
The submission rates of both types of liquidity traders are slightly greater in the ExtremityHigh cells. While these 
differences are not statistically significant, they may signal a possible volatility effect. It may be the case that instead 
of reacting to the ex-ante volatility of the security, traders react to actual price volatility. Such behavior makes sense 
because informed traders are present in the market. Liquidity traders could interpret high transaction price volatility 
as evidence of an extreme realized value and a greater likelihood of being picked-off as prices adjust. While there 
are no informed traders in Foucault's model, he generates a similar risk of being picked-off by combining true value 
volatility with the inability to cancel limit orders. Therefore, the weak pattern we observe with respect to extremity 
may reflect the intuition of Foucault's model but is generated by a different mechanism (the presence of informed 
traders in the market rather than frictions on the responses of traders to public information). 
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4.5. Trading Strategies and the State of the Book 
The state of the limit order book can influence order submission strategies.  Our main 
findings are that all traders react similarly to depth on the opposite side of the book, but that 
informed and liquidity traders behavior diverges when we consider same side depth.  We 
interpret this latter result as indicative of the quasi-dealer function played by informed traders. 
Our tests are motivated by Parlour [1998], who provides predictions on how depth at the 
best bid or offer (BBO) affects the likelihood of submitting a limit or a market order. She 
predicts that traders are less likely to use a limit order if the book on the same side as the order, 
say the ask side for a sell order, is thicker. This so called "crowding out" effect arises due to the 
time priority of orders already in the book lowering the probability of execution of a new limit 
order at the ask.  Parlour also predicts that traders are more likely to use limit orders if the book 
on the other side, say the bid side for a sell order, is thicker. (We note that there are no informed 
traders in Parlour's model; it is unclear whether these predictions will hold for either informed or 
liquidity traders in an environment in which some traders possess private information.) 
To test the association between depth and submission rates, we record for each market 
and limit order the depth level at the best prices on both the same side and the opposite side of 
the book.  To simplify the analysis, we consider only four levels of depth:  (1) depth less than or 
equal to two shares, (2) depth greater than two shares and less than or equal to four shares, (3) 
depth greater than four shares and less than or equal to six shares, and (4) depth greater than six 
shares.12  We calculate a separate submission rate for each trader in each level by dividing the 
                                                 
12
 We examined a couple of different bounds for the categories to make sure that our results are not driven by the 
arbitrary allocation into categories. The results we discuss in the text seem to be robust to perturbations of the 
bounds. 
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limit orders submitted in a certain level by the sum of limit and market orders in that level.  We 
also repeat the analysis considering only limit orders submitted at the best existing bid or offer.13 
Panel A of Figure 5 presents the submission rates for all orders conditional on four levels 
of depth on the same side as the order. The behavior of informed and large liquidity traders differ 
when there is a lot of depth in the book. The statistical test for differences in behavior 
(interaction Type*Depth), borders on significance (p=0.0627). The large decline in category 4 
for the large liquidity traders is consistent with Parlour’s prediction that traders are less likely to 
submit limit orders when depth on the same side of the BBO is greater. The simple effects 
analysis shows that this pattern in the behavior of the large liquidity traders is statistically 
significant (p=0.0355).    
In contrast, the informed traders show higher submission rates when the book is deep on 
the same side as the order.  This behavior may be due to the liquidity supply role taken on by the 
informed traders. In the theoretical model, existing depth in the book is not the making of the 
individual trader who decides between a limit and a market order. Here, both informed traders 
are more likely to act as dealers when such a strategy is profitable. Competition among the 
informed traders may cause them to submit additional limit orders even as depth on the same 
side increases.  
Submission rates for limit orders submitted only at the best existing bid or offer provide 
even stronger evidence of the same behavior.  For these orders the interaction of trader type and 
depth level is strongly significant (p=0.0016), as is the simple effect testing the pattern in the 
informed traders’ submission rates across depth levels (p=0.0017). While in the figure it looks as 
                                                 
13
 Note that in both cases, we condition only on depth in the book at the best bid or offer (not the entire book). The 
difference between the regular submission rate to the one that considers only the best existing bid or offer has to do 
with the limit orders submitted, not with the book. The first measure is the number of all limit order submitted (for a 
given depth level) divided by the sum of the limit and market orders submitted (at that depth level). The second 
measure has in the numerator only limit orders whose prices match the existing best bid or offer in the book. 
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if small liquidity traders also submit more limit orders as the depth on the same side increases, 
this pattern is not statistically significant and is not robust to perturbations in the bounds of the 
categories.   
Panel A of Figure 6 presents the submission rate of limit orders conditional on BBO 
depth on the other side of the book (say the ask side for a buy order). We find that all trader types 
increase their submission rates as the depth on the other side increases. The statistical tests 
confirm that the main effect of the Depth factor is highly significant (p<0.0001), but the 
interaction of Type*Depth is not. Thus, we cannot say unequivocally that the behavior of the 
informed traders is very different from the behavior of the liquidity traders. The steep increase in 
the submission rate of the informed traders, however, is highly significant (p=0.0001). The 
results are essentially identical when we consider only orders submitted at the best bid or offer 
(with p=0.0318 for the main effect of Depth).  
Parlour's prediction is that the greater the ask (bid) depth, the more likely are buyers 
(sellers) to submit limit orders. The intuition behind her result is that, focusing on the ask side, 
buyers rationally anticipate the crowding out of limit sell orders when the ask depth is greater, 
and so limit buy orders become more attractive (in anticipation of more market sell orders). Our 
results strongly support this prediction of her model.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this study we have investigated the evolution of liquidity in an electronic limit order 
market.  Our particular focus has been on the order behavior of informed and liquidity traders.  
As we have shown, informed traders and liquidity traders act quite differently in term of order 
submission strategies. Large liquidity traders prefer limit orders early in the trading period, but 
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their preference shifts over time toward using more market orders.  Their behavior corresponds 
relatively well to the predictions from theoretical models. 
This is not the case for informed trader behavior. We find that informed traders play a 
particularly intriguing, and heretofore unappreciated, role in electronic markets.  As predicted by 
theory, the informed do trade to capture the value of their private information.  However, this 
trading behavior is complex, involving the use of both limit orders and market orders.  Indeed, 
informed traders actually submit more limit orders than they do market orders.  This reflects the 
ability of informed traders to know better the true value of the asset, and so a source of profit for 
the informed is earning the bid-ask spread via limit order submission.  This behavior results in 
the informed providing liquidity to the market.  Such a “making liquidity” role explains why 
electronic markets can endogenously create liquidity even in the presence of information 
asymmetry.   
Electronic markets are now a ubiquitous feature of securities markets.  As trading 
increasingly shifts to electronic platforms, the nature of liquidity provision takes on greater 
importance.  An important contribution of our research is to make clearer how liquidity is 
provided in such a setting, and the factors that influence it. 
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Absolute Deviation of Security Value from Prior Expected Mean Value of $25. 
 
Actual values of securities traded equaled 25 plus or minus the indicated number. The sign of the deviation from 25 
varied across securities and across cohorts. Half of the cohorts traded securities in order 1, while the other half 
traded securities in order 2. Only the securities indicated in bold were used in the analysis; other securities were 
included only to allow security values to be distributed as indicated to traders. Low-volatility securities have 
deviations of 7 or less; high-volatility securities have deviations of 12 or more.  
 
Security Number Order 1 Order 2 
   
 Low-Volatility Setting High-Volatility Setting 
1 3 21 
2  (Low-Extremity) 2 2 
3  (High Extremity) 15 15 
4 4 13 
5  (Low-Extremity) 4 4 
6   7 24 
7 (High-Extremity) 20 20 
8 (High-Extremity) 16 16 
9 (Low Extremity) 6 6 
10 8 9 
 
  
 Low-Volatility Setting High Volatility Setting 
11 21 3 
12  (Low-Extremity) 7 7 
13  (High Extremity) 16 16 
14 13 4 
15  (Low-Extremity) 19 19 
16   24 7 
17 (High-Extremity) 3 3 
18 (High-Extremity) 17 17 
19 (Low Extremity) 1 1 





Submission Rate and Taking Rate by Volatility and Extremity Factors 
 
This table presents the submission rates, taking rates, and average trading profit per market for the different types of 
traders in each of the Volatility/Extremity cells. Submission Rate is defined as the number of limit orders a trader 
submits divided by the sum of her limit and market orders. Taking Rate is defined as the percentage of trades 
completed using market orders (the number of market orders a trader submits divided by the sum of her market 
orders and executed limit orders). Trading profit per market is defined as the sum, across all limit orders and market 
orders a trader submits, of the difference between the trading price and the true value of the security. The Volatility 
factor of the security's true value has two levels: high (a uniform distribution) and low (a bell-shaped distribution). 
The Extremity factor (how different the realized value of the security from its unconditional mean) has two levels: 
high (realized values that are at least $12 from expected value) and low (realized values that are no more than $7 
from expected value).  The two informed traders know the true value of the security before trading begins. One 
small liquidity trader needs to sell 5 shares and another needs to buy 5 shares. One large liquidity trader needs to sell 
20 shares and another needs to buy 20 shares. We first compute the variable under investigation for an individual 
trader and then the average for a trade type within each of the eight cohorts. The numbers in the table represent the 
averages across the cohorts. 
 
Panel A: Submission Rate of Limit Orders 
 
 Informed Small Liquidity Large Liquidity 
VolatilityLow/ExtremityLow 79.3% 65.3% 52.5% 
VolatilityLow/ExtremityHigh 61.6% 66.4% 59.3% 
VolatilityHigh/ExtremityLow 71.3% 62.2% 59.0% 
VolatilityHigh/ExtremityHigh 67.8% 64.2% 60.7% 
 
 
Panel B: "Taking Rate" or the Percentage of Trades Completed using Market Orders 
 
 Informed Small Liquidity Large Liquidity 
VolatilityLow/ExtremityLow 34.7% 43.7% 61.3% 
VolatilityLow/ExtremityHigh 55.0% 40.0% 51.5% 
VolatilityHigh/ExtremityLow 48.3% 45.1% 54.2% 
VolatilityHigh/ExtremityHigh 50.7% 43.0% 51.1% 
 
 
Panel C: Average Trading Profit per Market in Laboratory Dollars 
 
 Informed Small Liquidity Large Liquidity 
VolatilityLow/ExtremityLow 17.15   -8.81   -8.33 
VolatilityLow/ExtremityHigh 83.48 -51.35 -32.13 
VolatilityHigh/ExtremityLow 25.10   -8.35 -16.75 





Example of a Trading Screen 
 
This figure presents a screen snapshot for a practice security. The screen includes two graphs showing market 
activity. The left side of each graph shows every price at which an order has been posted (shown in green for the 
highest bid and lowest ask price, and yellow for other prices), and the number of shares posted at that price (shown 
by the number to the left of the graph). The right side of each graph shows every price at which the trader has 
personally posted an order, and the number of shares that the trader has posted at that price. The center of each graph 
also includes a solid red line indicating the highest bid or lowest ask entered by any trader, and a solid green line 




Market-Wide Summary Statistics 
 
This figure presents summary statistics for volume, bid-ask spread, and price errors over time. Volume is defined as 
the number of shares traded. Bid-ask spread is the difference between the best price in the book for buying a share 
and the best price in the book for selling a share. Absolute errors in trade price are defined as the absolute value of 
the difference between the trade price and the true value of the security. The variables are computed separately for 
each 15-second interval in the trading period. 
 


























































Summary Statistics of Traders' Strategies 
 
This figure presents summary statistics on orders and trades for the different types of traders. The two informed 
traders know the true value of the security before trading begins. One small liquidity trader needs to sell 5 shares and 
another needs to buy 5 shares. One large liquidity trader needs to sell 20 shares and another needs to buy 20 shares. 
Each limit order submitted by a trader is for one share. Market orders are defined as the taking of limit orders at the 
best prices in the book. Expired limit orders are orders that are left in the book at the end of the trading period while 
cancelled limit orders are those that traders actively remove from the book. Panel B plots the average number of 
shares executed by a trader who belongs to one of the three types. This variable is computed separately for each 15-
second interval in the trading period. 
 















































Limit and Market Order Strategies 
 
This figure presents the submission rates and taking rates for the different types of traders over time. The two 
informed traders know the true value of the security before trading begins. One small liquidity trader needs to sell 5 
shares and another needs to buy 5 shares. One large liquidity trader needs to sell 20 shares and another needs to buy 
20 shares. Submission Rate is defined as the number of limit orders a trader submits divided by the sum of her limit 
and market orders. Taking Rate is defined as the percentage of trades completed using market orders (the number of 
market orders a trader submits divided by the sum of her market orders and executed limit orders). The variables are 
computed separately for each 15-second interval in the trading period. 
 

















































Submission Rate Conditional on BBO Depth on the Same Side as Order 
 
This figure presents the submission rates of the different types of traders conditional on depth in the book at the best 
bid or offer (BBO) on the same side as the order. The two informed traders know the true value of the security 
before trading begins. One small liquidity trader needs to sell 5 shares and another needs to buy 5 shares. One large 
liquidity trader needs to sell 20 shares and another needs to buy 20 shares. Panel A reports the submission rate of 
limit orders (the number of limit orders a trader submits divided by the sum of her limit and market orders) 
conditional on four BBO depth levels: (1) depth less than or equal to two shares, (2) depth greater than two shares 
and less than or equal to four shares, (3) depth greater than four shares and less than or equal to six shares, and (4) 
depth greater than six shares. Panel B reports the number of limit orders submitted at the BBO for each level divided 
by the total number of limit and market orders in that depth level. 
 










































Submission Rate Conditional on BBO Depth on the Other Side of the Book 
 
This figure presents the submission rates of the different types of traders conditional on depth in the book at the best 
bid or offer (BBO) on the other side of the book (i.e., the ask side for a buy order). The two informed traders know 
the true value of the security before trading begins. One small liquidity trader needs to sell 5 shares and another 
needs to buy 5 shares. One large liquidity trader needs to sell 20 shares and another needs to buy 20 shares. Panel A 
reports the submission rate of limit orders (the number of limit orders a trader submits divided by the sum of her 
limit and market orders) conditional on four BBO depth levels: (1) depth less than or equal to two shares, (2) depth 
greater than two shares and less than or equal to four shares, (3) depth greater than four shares and less than or equal 
to six shares, and (4) depth greater than six shares. Panel B reports the number of limit orders submitted at the BBO 
for each level divided by the total number of limit and market orders in that depth level. 
 










































APPENDIX: INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS 
Overview 
During this session, you will trade shares of 20 securities that have values denominated in 
“laboratory dollars.” We convert your trading gains into U.S. dollars to determine your payment. 
At the end of trading, we will ask a series of questions about your experience. 
 
Value of a Security   
The true value of each security is distributed over the interval [0,50], in one of the ways 
shown below. For 10 securities, values will follow the distribution on the left, in which having a 
true value of 25 is as likely as having a true value of 2 or 48. For the other 10 securities, values 
will follow the distribution on the right, in which values near 25 are much more likely than more 
extreme values. The experiment administrator will make sure that everyone in your market 
knows which distribution is in force at all times during trading. 
 
How to Trade 
You trade shares by entering orders that others can “take” or by “taking” orders that 
others have entered. All orders are for one share, but you can enter and take multiple orders at 
each price. Here are your options:  
 
♦ Entering a Bid  A bid is an order to buy a share at a stated price. You will buy at that 
price if someone else chooses to take your bid, and sells a share to you at the price 
you indicated. 
 
♦ Entering an Ask. An ask is an order to sell a share at a stated price. You will sell at 
that price if someone else chooses to take your ask, and buys a share from you at the 
price you indicated. 
 
♦ Taking a Bid or Ask. If you click on the “SELL 1” button on the BID column, you 
will sell a share at the highest bid. If you click on the “BUY 1” button on the ASK 
column, you will buy a share at lowest ask.  
 
♦ Removing a bid or ask. You can remove (cancel) a bid or ask that you entered, 



























The Trading Period 
Trading for each security is split into two parts: pre-trading and main trading. 
 
♦ Pre-Trading (30 seconds). During the pre-trading period, traders can enter bids and 
asks, but no one can take them. At the end of pre-trading, the highest bid and the 
lowest ask will be paired up. If they “cross” (the bid is priced higher than or equal to 
the ask) the more recent order will be deleted. This will be repeated until there are no 
crossing orders remaining. 
 
♦ Main Trading (120 seconds). During the main trading period, all traders can enter 
bids and asks, and can also take the bids and asks entered by other traders. 
 
Some Trading Rules 
The following rules keep you from entering or taking any orders you please. 
 
♦ You can’t trade with yourself. If you try to take an order you entered, your request 
will be rejected. 
 
♦ You can never enter a bid at a price greater than your own ask, or an ask at a price 
less than your own bid. Doing so would be like trying to trade with yourself. 
  
♦ During Main Trading, you can’t enter a crossing order (a bid higher than an existing 
ask or an ask lower than an existing bid). If you are willing to buy at the lowest ask, 
simply click the “BUY 1” button. If you are willing to sell at the highest bid, simply 
click the “SELL 1” button. 
 
Trader Types 
The session includes two types of traders. 
 
♦ Informed Traders know the true value of the security, which they learn before 
trading begins. 
 
♦ Target Traders don’t know the value of the security. However, each has a trading 
“target” to meet before trading is complete. One trader’s target is to sell 20 shares; 
another’s is to buy 20 shares; another’s is to sell 5 shares, and another’s is to buy 5 
shares. If you have a target, it will be stated clearly on your screen. At the end of 
trading, you will be assessed a penalty equal to $50 for each unfulfilled share. This 
penalty is large enough that it is worth trading at any price, no matter how 
unfavorable, to hit your target. The goal of a target trader is to meet his or her goal at 
the most favorable prices possible. Once they hit their targets, target traders can buy 




You start each security with $0 and 0 shares. However, negative cash and share balances 
are permitted. Thus, you can buy shares even if you don’t have money to pay for them, and you 
can sell shares you don’t own (“short selling”).  
 
At the end of trading for each security, the shares you own pay a liquidating dividend 
equal to their true value. If you have a positive balance of shares, the dividend is added to your 
cash balance for each share you own. If you have a negative balance of shares, the dividend is 
subtracted from your cash balance for each share you own. The resulting number is your trading 
gain (if positive) or trading loss (if negative). Any penalties assessed for failing to hit a trading 
target are deducted from your trading gain or added to your trading loss. 
 
You make money every time you buy a share for less than true value or sell a share for 
more than true value. For example, buying a share worth $30 at a price of $23 creates a gain of 
$7. Selling that share at that price creates a loss of $7.  
 
Converting Laboratory Dollars into US Dollars. 
Laboratory winnings, as described above, will be converted into US$ according to the 
formula 
 
US$ Payment = Exchange Rate x (Net Gain/Loss in Laboratory $ + “Adjustment”). 
 
You are guaranteed a minimum payment of US$10. 
 
You will not learn the exact adjustment or exchange rates. However, we will tell you two 
key facts. First, the exchange rate is positive, meaning that the more laboratory dollars you win, 
or the fewer you lose, the more $US you take home. Second, different types of traders have 
different adjustments. Target traders have a positive adjustment, meaning that they can lose 
laboratory dollars but still take home a substantial payment. Informed traders have negative 
adjustments, meaning that they need to earn some number of laboratory dollars in order to 
receive more than the minimum payment. The parameters are set so that the average winnings 
will be approximately US$25 for each person for the session.  
 
Other Rules 
Please do not talk with other subjects or look at their computer screens without explicit 
permission from the experiment administrator. Please ask the administrator before leaving the 




This is a research experiment intended to help regulators and researchers understand the 
functioning of financial markets and business decision-making.  If you have any questions about 
the administration of this experiment, please contact Professor Robert Bloomfield 
(rjb9@cornell.edu, 255-9407, 450 Sage Hall, Cornell University). Participants can also contact 
the University Committee on Human Subjects (uchs-mailbox@cornell.edu, 255-2943, 115 Day 
Hall, Cornell University). 
In order to participate, you must sign the consent form below: 
 
I consent to participate in this trading session, and agree to abide by all of the rules 
previously described to me by the administrator throughout my participation. I recognize 
that:  
 
(1) If I breach any of the rules governing my behavior, I forfeit my right to any money I 
might have earned by participating;  
 
(2) I have the right to leave the experiment at any time, without penalty, but that in doing 
so I forfeit my right to any money I might have earned by trading;  
 
(3) This experiment has been approved by the Cornell University Committee on Human 
Subjects as research that uses no deception of any kind.  
 
I understand that my performance will be kept private, and that the research is intended to 
help clarify the nature of decisions made in business settings like the one arising in this 
session. 
 
 
Signed _________________________________ 
 
Date ___________________________________ 
 
 
 
